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Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations
Fulvio Fracassi*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is often said that confidentiality is one of the benefits of international
commercial arbitration and one of the principal reasons why business people have
made arbitration the forum of choice for the resolution of international commercial
disputes. Others have gone further and suggested that parties "place the highest value
upon confidentiality as a fundamental characteristic of international commercial
arbitration."' No authority is generally cited for such a proposition but it is seen as
implicit or a corollary to an agreement to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration.'
Claimants in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") Chapter 11
arbitrations have generally relied on this notion that the private nature of arbitrations
gives rise to a duty of confidentiality, with some success, to support their contention
that materials generated and produced in Chapter 11 proceedings cannot be made
publicly available. This has led to criticisms from nongovernmental organizations
('NGOs") and others that the NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute settlement mechanism is
secretive and not open to public scrutiny. This paper argues that the existence of a
general principle of confidentiality applicable to commercial arbitrations is far from a
settled issue, and more importantly, if it does exist, it should have no application in
the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral proceedings.
I. THE CONFLICTING STATE OF THE LAW ON CONFIDENTIALITY
The question of whether the private nature of commercial arbitrations gives rise
to a general principle of confidentiality that applies to arbitrations and the materials
generated and produced therein has been the subject of much debate and discussion
* Senior Counsel with the Canadian Department of Justice and Head of the NAFTA Chapter 11
Unit of the Trade Law Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the .iews of the
Government of Canada.
1. Expert Report of Stephen Bond Esq (in Esso/BHP v Plowman), 11 Arbit Intl 273 (1995).
2. See Ronald Bernstein, Handbook ofArbitration Practice 193 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed 1998).
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over the last few years. This lack of consensus is amply demonstrated by case law and
commentaries on this subject. As L. Yves Fortier, President of the London Court of
International Arbitration, notes in his recent article on confidentiality in arbitrations:
These questions [of privacy and its corollary confidentiality] have, in fact been the
subject of much heated debate recently, in various jurisdictions and institutions. The
conclusions reached in those instances demonstrate what might be called a definite
lack of consensus.'
A brief analysis of some of the more well-known decisions is appropriate for
purposes of this discussion. The recent decision of the Swedish Supreme Court in
Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v AI Trade Finance Inc is of particular note.4 The
parties in this case were involved in an arbitration in which the defendant had an
award affirming the tribunal's jurisdiction published in an arbitration journal. Upon
learning of the publication, the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank applied to the arbitral
panel to have the arbitration agreement declared null and void for alleged breach of
the confidentiality obligation. The panel refused to do so and ultimately issued a final
award. The issue was appealed to the domestic courts and made its way to the
Swedish Supreme Court. The court found that the existence of a privacy rule in an
arbitration agreement does not give rise under Swedish law to a separate duty of
confidentiality. More specifically, the court found that the private nature of
commercial arbitrations and the existence of an in camera rule in an agreement to
arbitrate simply means that the public does not have a right to attend hearings. There
is no contradiction, the court notes, with parties to the dispute being simultaneously
entitled to disclose information to outsiders concerning the arbitration proceedings.
The court concludes by holding:
the Supreme Court considers that a party in arbitration proceedings cannot be
deemedto be bound by a duty of confidentiality, unless the parties have concluded
an agreement concerning this.
A similar approach was taken by the High Court of Australia in the case of
Esso/BHP v Plowman,' one of the more noted cases on the issue of confidentiality of
arbitral proceedings. Briefly, in this case the Minister for Energy and Minerals of the
state of Victoria made clear his intention to disclose all information produced in the
arbitration by Esso/BHP. Soon after making this announcement the Minister applied
to the court to confirm that he was entitled to do so. Ultimately, the case reached the
Australian High Court. The High Court held that there was a distinction between
3. L. Yves Fortier, The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 Arbir Intl 131, 131-32
(1999).
4. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v A.I. Trade Finance Inc, Case no T 1881-99 (Swed S Ct 2000),
unofficial English translation available online at
<hrrp://www.chamber.se/arbirration/shared-files/news-display.asp.lang=2&id=35> (visited Mar
25, 2001).
5. Id at 10.
6. Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman, 128 Austl L Rep 391 (1995).
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the privacy of hearings and the secrecy of proceedings in general and conduded that
confidentiality is not an essential attribute of a private arbitration and is not to be
implied from an agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, it held that a requirement to
conduct proceedings in camera did not impose an obligation prohibiting disclosure of
documents and information provided in and for the purposes of the arbitration! The
court then went on to hold that even if some kind of confidentiality did attach it was
not absolute and that a public interest exception applied:
[I]n the public sector, the need is for compelled openness, not for burgeoning
secrecy. The present case is a striking illustration of this principle. Why should the
consumers and the public of Victoria be denied knowledge of what happens in these
arbitrations, the outcome of which will affect, in all probability, the prices chargeable
to consumers by public utilities?
The proposition that the private or in camera nature of commercial arbitration
proceedings is distinct from and does not give rise to a general obligation of
confidentiality that applies to arbitrations and documents produced therein has also
found support in the US District Court in United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp.9 In
this case, the US Government sought and was granted an order for the production of
documents relating to an International Chamber of Commerce arbitration involving a
subsidiary of Panhandle. The court's statement that there was a failure to point to any
actual agreement of confidentiality, documented or otherwise, strongly suggests that
the court gave very little weight to arguments made regarding the confidentiality of
arbitrations arising from an agreement to arbitrate in private.
Admittedly, this is far from a one-sided issue. Distinguished English
commentators and noted arbitrators have expressed the view that a duty of
confidentiality does apply to commercial arbitrations and that this duty of
confidentiality attaches to documents produced in an arbitration." To this effect, in a
comprehensive review of this issue a distinguished English commentator stated
But, for my part, if I had to express my opinion as to the common perception of
English lawyers and other professionals practising in English arbitrations and,
spealdng more broadly, about the common perception of those practising in the field
of international commercial arbitration, I would say that the common
understanding has always been that not only are arbitrations to be held in private,
but that all information concerning them and what transpires in the arbitration
room is to be treated as strictly confidential. 2
7. See id at paras 34-35.
8. Id at para 40.
9. United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp, 118 FRD 346 (D Del 1988).
10. See id at 350.
11. See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Comrnereal Artitrati:n 27-30
(Sweet & Maxw:ell 3d ed 1999).




Lord Justice Porter of the English Court of Appeal in Ali Shipping Corporation v
Shipyard Trogir"3 also provides an insight into the English view on confidentiality of
arbitrations. After citing previous decisions of the English courts on this issue with
approval, Potter, LJ, concludes that confidentiality does not arise because of the
private nature of arbitrations but attaches as an implied term to an arbitration
agreement. In this regard, Potter, LJ, states:
It seems to me that, in holding as a matter of principle that the obligation of
confidentiality (whatever its precise limits) arises as an essential corollary of the
privacy of arbitration proceedings, the Court is pro jounding a term which arises "as
the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires.
The most recent decision to recognize the conflicting nature of judicial decisions
and authoritative writings on the issue of confidentiality of arbitrations has been the
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral decision in Metbanex Corp v United States." In this
decision, the Metbanex tribunal was considering a petition from non-parties to the
arbitration to participate as amicus curiae in which the petitioners also requested
access to confidential documents generated and produced in the arbitration. In
responding to this portion of the petitioners request, the Metbanex tribunal considered
case law discussed above and concluded that with respect to Sweden, Australia and
the United States, the existence of a clause or undertaking in an arbitration agreement
to conduct proceedings in private does not give rise to an obligation of confidentiality,
particularly in cases where public authorities or the public interest is involved."
Although the tribunal acknowledged that English decisions generally point in the
opposite direction, it also states that:
Even in England, however, the present position is arguably equivocal in regard to
public authorities (including a state party), particularly given the absence of any
statutory rule in the English Arbitration Act 1996.17
Ultimately, the Metbanex tribunal did not make a final determination as to the
existence or applicability of a general duty of confidentiality to NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations given the existence, in that case, of a consent order regarding disclosure
and confidentiality agreed to by the disputing parties.
The impact of judicial pronouncements from courts in Australia, Sweden and
the United States on the distinction between privacy of arbitrations and a duty of
confidentiality cannot be denied. Certainly they counterbalance the approach taken by
the English courts and arguably create severe doubts on the question of whether, as a
13. 1 Lloyd's 643 (Eng Ct App 1998).
14. Id at 651.
15. UNCITRAL Decision (Jan 15, 2001) (on file with the Chicago Journal of International Law).
16. See id at paras 43, 45.
17. Id at para 44.
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general legal principle, international commercial arbitrations are confidential." As
Edward C. Chiasson, QC, notes:
Commercial arbitration is the creature of consent. Parties can agree that their
chosen dispute resolution process will be confidential, but if they do not do so it is
questionable whether a legal requirement of confidentiality will exist independent of
such agreement.
After much consideration of this difficult issue by courts and various jurists, all
that can really be concluded is that confidentiality should not be assumed simply
because parties have entered into an arbitration agreement containing a clause or
undertaking to conduct proceedings in private.
IllI. THE APPLICABILITY OF A PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY TO NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION
Even if one accepts as a general principle that the private nature of commercial
arbitrations or the existence of a privacy rule in arbitration agreements give rise to an
obligation of confidentiality, such a principle, arguably, has no application to NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitral proceedings.
NAFTA is not a private commercial arbitration contract but an international
treaty between three sovereign states. Arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11 are
between an investor and a state. They are not between private parties who chose to
resolve their dispute by way of arbitration in order to preserve the confidentiality of
the dispute. Therefore, NAFTA cannot implicitly give rise to an obligation of
confidentiality owing to non-parties to the treaty. Moreover, NAFTA Chapter 11
contains no general rule or principle of confidentiality prohibiting the publicity of
Chapter 11 proceedings.
The first NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal to consider this issue was in Metaiclad
Corp v United Mexican States." The Mexican government had sought a formal order
from the tribunal that the proceedings were confidential and that breach of such an
order would permit Mexico to request that the tribunal enforce sanctions. In rejecting
Mexico's request, the Metaclad tribunal held that NAFTA, ICSID (Additional
Facility) Rules, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules contain no express restriction
on the freedom of the disputing parties to make publicly available information
concerning the arbitration.23
18. Consider Editorial, The Decision of tle High Court of Australia in Esso/BHP v Plowman, 11 Arbir Ind
231(1995).
19. Edward C. Chiasson, QC, Confidentiality and Arbitration, 58 Advocate 417 (2000).
20. ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Sept 2, 2000) at para 13 (on file with the ChicagoJournal
ofInternational Law).
21. Although the Tribunal did recognize that nothing in NAFTA Chapter 11 or the applicable
arbitration rules prohibited publicity of the arbitration, the Tribunal did state that it would be of
advantage to the orderly conduct of proceedings and maintenance of working relations betwen the
disputing parties if during proceedings both parties limited public disclosure to a minimum. Id.
Spring 2001 217
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The NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal in SD Myers, Inc v Canada has also recognized
the non-applicability of a general principle of confidentiality to NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations:
The Tribunal considers that, whatever may be the position in private consensual
arbitrations between commercial parties, it has not been established that any general
principle of confidentiality exists in an arbitration such as that currently before this
tribunal. The main argument in favour of confidentiality is founded on a supposed
implied term in the arbitration agreement. The present arbitration is taking place
pursuant to a provision in an international treaty, not pursuant to an arbitration
agreement between disputing parties.
There is no direct contractual link between the disputing parties in the present case,
and there is no arbitration agreement between them. In the absence of an established
neral principle it is necessary to examine the treaty itself and the UNCITRAL
ules, which apply to the arbitration proceedings by election of MYERS exercising
its right under Article 1120 of the NAFTA, as well as the Tribunal's previous
procedural orders.
The decision on disclosure of information in Loewen Group, Inc v United States23 is
yet another example of a Chapter 11 tribunal rejecting the sweeping proposition that a
general principle of confidentiality applies to arbitrations under NAFTA. In addition
to rejecting the existence of a general obligation of confidentiality, the Loewen tribunal
made the following statement regarding arbitrations in which one of the parties is a
government:
In the case of an arbitration under NAFTA, particularly an arbitration to which a
Government is a party, it is not to be supposed that, in the absence of express
provision, the Convention or the Rules and Regulations impose a general obligation
on the parties the effect of which would be to preclude a Government (or the-other
party) from discussing the case in public, d the pubic of knowledge
and information concerning government and publc affairs.
Despite these pronouncements, some NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals have
nevertheless interpreted the in camera rule found in the arbitration rules to require
disputing parties to keep materials filed in the arbitration confidential. For example,
the SD Myers tribunal, after finding that no general principle of confidentiality applied
to NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings, concluded that Article 25(4) of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules which provides for private hearings extended to
written submissions of the disputing parties as such materials effectively form part of
the hearing. The tribunal then went on to state:
It would be artificial and might adversely affect the efficient organization of Chapter
Eleven arbitration proceedings if such materials [written submissions, trial exhibits
etc.] were to be deemed less private [than the hearings].
22. UNCITRAL Decision (May 13, 2000) (Procedural Order No 16) paras 8-9 (on file with the
Chicago Journal of International Law).
23. ICSID Case no ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision (Sept 28, 1999) (on file with author).
24. Id at para 8.
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That under the UNCITRAL Rules arbitration hearings are private and cannot
be attended by strangers without the consent of both disputing parties is not
contested. Nor is it disputed that limiting attendance at hearings may be desirable in
order to ensure the orderly and effective administration of arbitral proceedings.
However, it is difficult to appreciate how state parties to an arbitration sharing with
their constituents arbitral submissions would affect the orderly administration of an
arbitral hearing. Measures can easily be put in place, as is regularly done by domestic
courts or tribunals, to ensure that confidential business information is protected from
disclosure.
It is difficult to reconcile tribunal decisions that on the one hand state that no
general principle of confidentiality applies to NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations but at
the same time extend a duty of confidentiality over materials generated and produced
in the arbitrations by virtue of the fact that the hearings are private. As discussed
earlier, it is this very notion that confidentiality arises from the existence of a privacy
rule in an arbitration agreement that is unsettled in the juridical world. Moreover, the
main argument that confidentiality is implied by virtue of the fact that parties have
entered into a contract to arbitrate in private clearly has no application in the context
of a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration. How then can one justify its use in NAFTA
Chapter 11 arbitrations?
Furthermore, it is far from clear that the private nature of the arbitral hearings
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the ICSID (Additional Facility) Rules
creates any obligation or expectation of confidentiality over documents submitted in
arbitral proceedings. With respect to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the
UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings make dear that
confidentiality cannot be assumed simply because the hearings are private. To this
effect, the UNCITRAL Notes provide, inter alia, that.
Moreover, parties that have agreed on arbitration rules or other provisions that do
not expressly address the issue of confidentiality cannot assume that all jurisdictions
would recognize an implied commitment to confidentiality. Furthermore, the
participants in an arbitration might not have the same understanding as regards the
extent of confidentiality that is expected.
The UNCITRAL Notes then go on to state:
An agreement on confidentiality might cover, for example, one or more of the
following matters: the material or information that is to be kept confidential (e.g.
pieces of evidence, written and oral arguments, the fact that the arbitration is taking
place, identity of the arbitrators, content of the award).?
If the confidentiality of written materials could dearly be derived from the
provision requiring in camera proceedings there would be no need for a confidentiality
25. UNCTRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings para 31 (UN 1995). The Notes do not impo:e
any legal requirement binding on the arbitrators or the parties.




agreement of the type proposed by the UNCITRAL Notes. Edward C. Chiasson,
QC, in his recent article on confidentiality and arbitration, also noted that the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules simply provide for private hearings and are otherwise
silent on confidentiality.'
With respect to disclosure of documents produced in NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations conducted under the ICSID (Additional Facility) Rules, the official
annotations accompanying the original version of the ICSID rules for arbitration
under the Convention are of particular note. The relevant portion of the annotations
provides:
The parties are not prohibited from publishing their pleadings. They may, however,
come to an understanding to refrain from doing so, particularly if they feel that
publication may exacerbate the dispute.28
Interestingly, the Additional Facility rules invoked to justify non-disclosure of
documents were derived word-for-word from the version of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules for which these annotations were prepared. With all due respect, given the
above, it is difficult to accept the conclusion that parties to NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations are precluded from disclosing documents produced in arbitral
proceedings particularly if confidential business information is redacted prior to
disclosure. Absent a confidentiality agreement between disputing parties, no
confidentiality should attach to documents produced in NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations.
There is another element to this debate that I have alluded to but have not yet
specifically addressed, and that is the issue of public interest. NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations differ from private commercial arbitrations in three fundamental ways.
First, they involve claims by a party against a state that challenge sovereign acts under
international law. Second, they differ from private commercial arbitrations by virtue
of the far-reaching public policy ramifications that their awards may have for all
NAFTA Parties. Third, these claims may have serious implications for the public
purse for which governments are accountable to the people. The scope and extent of
the public policy and monetary implications of these cases becomes evident when one
considers the type of cases brought forward to date and the amount of damages
claimed. For example, investors have challenged environmental regulations in each of
the three NAFTA countries and in some instances the conduct of domestic courts. In
all of these cases investors are seeking tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages.
27. Chiasson, 58 Advocate at 418 (cited in note 19).
28. ICSID Regulations & Rules Rule 30 n F (ICSID 1975). The annotations were prepared by the
Secretariat of the Centre but do not constitute part of the Rules and have no legal force. The
Administrative Council considered that they might be useful to the parties to proceedings and
published them together with the texts of the Rules.
VOI 2. 0.1
Confi&ntiaity andW2.-A A C16 apter 11 .Arfitrations
When NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals are considering to what extent, if any,
confidentiality attaches to NAFTA arbitrations, they should, in my view, also
consider the broad and far-reaching public policy and monetary implications of the
claims for NAFTA countries. As noted earlier, various jurisdictions have recognized
the existence of a public interest exception. With respect to Chapter 11 tribunals, the
pronouncements of the Metbanex tribunal regarding public interest and the benefits of
greater transparency are particularly noteworthy
The public interest in this arbitration arises from its subject matter [a challenge to
an environmental regulation], as powerfully suggested by the Petitions [requesting
amicus curiae participation]. There is also a broader argument, as suggested by the
Respondent and Canada: the Chapter 11 arbitral process could benefit from being
perceived as more open or transparent, or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly
secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus submissions
might support the process in general and this-arbitration in particular; whereas a
bla net refusal could do positive harm.
Perhaps this statement and others are an indication that Chapter 11 tribunals are
beginning to have a greater appreciation for the distinctive nature of Chapter 11
arbitrations and the public interest inherent in these disputes. However, to date, most
substantive submissions made in Chapter 11 proceedings are confidential and may not
be disclosed, except pursuant to law.'
Arbitrations that have broad and far-reaching public policy implications tend to
draw attention from media and nongovernmental organizations. Maintaining a
shroud of confidentiality over proceedings and documentation simply draws intense
criticism and does harm to the legitimacy of the process. Canada and other NAFTA
countries have taken concrete steps to improve the transparency of NAFTA Chapter
11 arbitral process by making certain documents such as the notice of intent, notice of
arbitration, orders and awards publicly available. In some instances statements of
claim and defense have also been made public.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confidentiality is not a prerequisite to resolving disputes under NAFTA
Chapter 11.
Investors who choose to submit disputes to arbitration under this chapter of the
NAFTA should accept that information and documents relating to these claims must
be made publicly available because of their far-reaching public policy and monetary
implications. It is too early to tell how this issue will ultimately be resolved. However,
the challenge for NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals will be to address these claims in a
29. Methanex at para 49.
30. For the most part NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals have recognized that a statutory duty to discoic





manner that takes into account the public interest and the accountability of
democratic governments to the public.
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